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Abstract 
Given the structural differences in banking sector and financial regulation 
at country level in European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), this pa- 
per tries to estimate the banking sector risk behavior at country level. Based 
on contingent claim literature, it computes “Distance-to-default (DtD)” at 
bank level and analyses the aggregate series at country level for a representa- 
tive set of banks over the period 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. The indices provide an 
intuitive, forward-looking and timely risk measure having strong 
correlations with national/regional market sentiment indicators. An 
underlying trend exists but causality tests suggest no systemic 
component. Cross-sectional differences in DtD suggests fragility in EMU 
countries 12-18 months prior to the crisis and better predictive ability than 
the regulatory index based on large and complex banking institutions at 
European level. Furthermore, we explore the reasons for this divergence 
using VAR estimates. 
Keywords: contingent claim analysis, Distance-to-default, banking  risk 
JEL: G01, G13, G21,  G28 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis have exacerbated the need to understand and monitor the 
bank risk behavior. Renewed attention is being focused at the global scale 
to enhance 
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and extend risk measurement methodologies. The eurozone is no exception 
and the twin objective of the European Central Bank (ECB) - price and 
financial system stability - places a strong emphasis on Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) but relies on individual countries’ 
central banks to supervise smaller financial  institutions. 
This paper deviates from this current and in our view excessive focus and 
attention on detecting and monitoring risk at European banking level. We 
take a step backward and introduce a micro approach to document and mon- 
itor the buildup of banking sector risk at country level. Based on contingent 
claims literature, we calculate “Distance-to-default (DtD)”at bank level and 
analyze the aggregate series at country level for a representative set of banks 
over the period 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. Conceivably, if regulators pay greater 
attention to country-specific buildups of risk and their connectedness, they 
might take actions earlier to mitigate the extent and impact of future crisis. 
There are many reasons for this choice. First, the structure of the bank-  
ing sector within EMU countries varies considerably. In the case of Germany, 
Finland and the Netherlands, total banking sector assets are relatively con- 
centrated, while in Italy, Greece, France and Austria, they are distributed 
quite equitably. Figure 1 summarizes this information by plotting the relative 
size of banking firms (by total assets in 2010) in individual EMU countries, 
where the total asset of the biggest bank in a particular country is normal- 
ized to one. Excessive asset concentration lowers regulatory cost but makes 
countries vulnerable to the actions of individual institutions. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Second, countries economic dependence on the banking sector varies 
drastically.1 Consider the case of Luxembourg, where the total financial 
assets under management is roughly 25 times the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at current prices while, in Greece, Italy and Finland, this multiple 
is less than three (Figure 2a). In some countries, all financial services are 
provided by banks, while in others there are specialized mortgage, pension 
and insurance companies. Given the existence of deposit insurance at the 
national level, governments implicitly or explicitly guarantee bank 
deposits; which in 
 
 
 
1We consider total asset managed by banking firms as a proxy for relative economic 
dependence. 
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times of stress, can transfer huge contingent liabilities onto sovereign’s bal- 
ance sheets and bailing out may lead to the weakening of government’s own 
position. 
 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
 
Third, the excessive home bias in European banks’ asset portfolios (Fig- 
ure 2b) creates a vicious circle for risk transfer between banks and 
sovereigns, which creates perverse economic and political incentives for 
government to save domestic banks. The existence of financial regulation 
at national level provides governments with the means to pursue their 
own national interests. Also noteworthy is the home bias in the private 
investors portfolio (Belke and Schneider (2013)) which aggravates this 
problem further. Neighborhood effects, close connectedness with certain 
countries and cross country differences in bailout strategy also motivate 
the monitoring of bank risk at country level. 
Given this background, the main objective of the paper is to document 
the evolution of country level banking risk indices. The central questions 
addressed here are: 
• Does this risk measure provide useful information on the buildup of 
risk?; 
• Does it render utile insights into market sentiments?; 
• Can it perform better than regulatory measure of prudential risk?; and 
• Is there strong dependence among countries banking sector? 
As it turns out, country level DtDs are simple, convenient and intuitive 
forward looking risk measures. The level of DtD differentiates countries 
based on the structural differences in their financial sectors and shows 
strong correlations with national and regional market sentiments. The 
improved informational content helps it outperform the regulatory risk 
measures based at European level and the causal linkages run from 
aggregate country level DtDs to Euro wide regulatory indicators. The 
country level DtDs do show very high correlations but causality and 
connectedness tests reveal no systemic component. This supports our 
argument of the need to measure risk indices at country level. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways: (1) we use a 
novel bottom-up approach to understanding systemic risk buildup in the 
banking sector and risk-shifting behavior in EMU countries; (2) we use one 
of the most comprehensive representative databases for the EMU financial 
sector; (3) we do not neglect the banking sector of smaller countries, which 
may not be relevant at EMU level but will be relevant at country level; and 
(4) to our knowledge, this is the first paper which tries to establish a link 
between country-specific buildup of financial risk with euro-wide aggregate 
risk indicators and national and regional market  sentiments. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
prior literature that used different frameworks to understand bank 
fragility and justifies our selection of DtD as banking risk indicator. 
Section 3 describes the sample data used to construct, analyze and 
calibrate the individual and aggregate DtD series. Section 4 first 
documents the behavior of returns, volatility and DtD for each EMU 
country; it then analyses these behaviors jointly and presents some cross-
sectional econometric analysis to gauge the predictive ability and market 
association of the country-specific DtD indicators. Section 5 documents 
the connectedness among country level banking risk. Section 6 draws 
conclusions. 
 
2. Choice of risk indicator 
Based on the survey of the existing risk measure techniques, we employed 
three basic criteria for indicator selection. It should: (1) identify the existing 
balance sheet fragility; (2) incorporate uncertainty using forward looking 
market measure; and (3) provide quantifiable risk indicators to assess 
relative creditworthiness (Gapen et al. (2005)). A comprehensive 
literature survey suggest that most of bank risk indicators can be 
classified into two broad categories: 
1. Pure balance sheet based ratios: Traditional approaches to assess the 
risk of a firm based on accounting ratios (see Altman (1968), Altman 
and Katz (1976), Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski 
(1984), Blume et al. (1998) among others). Key accounting ratios were 
identified and using multivariate discriminant or multinomial choice 
models, firm’s default probability were estimated. However the con- 
sensus on the accuracy and stress prediction ability of these indicators 
was relatively low. 
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These models have generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) 
the absence of a underlying theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of 
the information;2 and (3) the lack of uncertainty and forward-
looking component. The selected methodologies also introduce 
sample selec- tion bias, generating inconsistent coefficient estimates 
(e.g., Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Thomas et al. 
(2012)). 
2. Pure market based measures: These are determined directly in the 
market place (e.g. stock prices, aggregate realized volatility, aggregate 
book/market leverage, turbulence (a measure of excess volatility rel- 
ative to market), liquidity ratios and credit condition (credit default 
swaps)). These measures lack an underlying theoretical framework 
but the timely availability and continuous incorporation of informa- 
tion helps improve the relative performance and predictive ability in 
most cases (see Agarwal and Taffler (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), 
Gropp et al. (2006), Jorion (2006), Vassalou and Yuhang (2004)). 
The contingent claims based model of Merton (1974) provides a theoret- 
ical underpinning and answers some of these criticisms. The basic model is 
based on the priority structure of balance sheet liabilities and uses the 
standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula to value the junior claims 
as call option on firms’ value with the value of senior claims as default 
barrier. The structural underpinning and the combination of market-
based and account- ing information helps obtain a comprehensive set of 
financial risk indicators, e.g: DtD, probabilities of default, credit spreads, 
etc. 
Additionally, this measure captures the current period instability 
(using volatility), a forward-looking component (using stock prices) and 
balance sheet mismatch (using capital structure), in accordance with our 
requirements. It has been widely applied to assess the ability of 
corporates, banks and sovereigns to service their debt. Banking 
applications follow CCA by interpreting a bank’s equity as a call option 
on its value given the limited liability of shareholders. This approach was 
further refined by Vasicek (1984) and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is 
applied professionally in Moody’s KMV to predict default. 
 
 
 
2These models use information from financial statements which are based on past 
performance and are available only at a quarterly or an annual frequency; thus, they fail to 
capture changes in the financial conditions of the borrowing firm. 
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The DtD approach has been widely cited and reviewed by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF), European Central Bank (ECB) and Office 
of Federal Research (OFR) as a tool for enhancing bank risk analysis. A 
number of applications of this approach have been studied to analyze dif- 
ferent dimensions of risk. Several papers have examined the usefulness of 
DtD as a tool for predicting corporate and bank failure (Jessen and Lando 
(2015), Koutsomanoli-Filippakia and Mamatzakis (2009), Qia et al. (2014), 
Kealhofer (2003), Oderda et al. (2003), Vassalou and Yuhang (2004), Gropp 
et al. (2006), Harada et al. (2010), Thomas et al. (2012)). They have found 
DtD to be a powerful measure to predict bankruptcy and rating down- 
grades. Comparative analysis of DtD (Hillegeist et al. (2004),  Campbell 
et al. (2008), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Vassalou and Yuhang (2004), 
Jessen and Lando (2015) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008)) also suggests that 
DtD can be a powerful proxy to determine default. Note that here we don’t 
intend to improve the performance of this risk measure technique but aim 
to use it more effectively in order to capture the banking sector fragility. 
This approach will help supplement the existing methodologies that failed to 
capture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis. 
 
2.1.  Calculation methodology 
The foundation for this model lies with the structural model of default 
developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Since equity is 
a junior claim to debt, it can be modeled and calculated as a standard call 
option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also 
known in the literature as distress barrier or default barrier). 
The model uses no arbitrage conditions and assumes a frictionless 
market. The stochastic process generating the firm’s assets return are 
described by the diffusion process with a constant variance per unit time 
(σA). Following standard literature, we assume that financial distress and 
bankruptcy are costless.3   A firm has a simple capital structure with N 
shares of  common stock with market capital E and zero coupon bonds 
with a face value of D with time to maturity T . The estimation 
methodology is as follows. We use the value conservation equation: 
A = E + De−rT (1) 
 
 
 
3Here we assume that equity market price will reflect the cost of bankruptcy. 
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Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian 
Motion, the application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing 
formula (Black and Scholes (1973)) yields the closed-form  expression: 
E = AN (d1) − e−rT DN (d2) (2) 
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N (∗) is the cumu- 
lative normal distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as: 
ln( A ) + (r + 0.5σ2 )T 
d1 = 
D √ A 
σA T 
√   
(3) 
d2  = d1 − σA T (4) 
The Merton model uses an additional equation that links the asset volatil- 
ity σA  to the volatility of the bank’s equity σE  by applying Ito’s Lemma: 
A 
σE = N (d1) 
E 
σA (5) 
Using Eqs. 2 and 5, we obtain the implied asset value A and volatility 
σA, by inverting the two relationships. Once numerical solutions for A and 
σA are found, the T periods ahead DtD is calculated as: 
A − D 
DtD = 
σAA 
(6) 
DtD can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations the value 
of a firm’s asset is away from its default barrier. This standardization across 
firm size and volatility can be used to rank firms in terms of their relative 
credit worthiness. The three key inputs in calculating the DtD (market capi- 
talization, debt, and the volatility of equity) implies that it can be influenced 
by the leverage ratio (debt/(equity + debt)) and volatility of the firm. A 
higher value of DtD can be obtained either because the leverage of the firm is 
low or because the volatility is low or both (Figure 3). As can be noted, at a 
fixed level of volatility and low levels of leverage, DtD changes are small and 
insignificant for changes in leverage; while for a constant level of leverage, 
DtD shows much sharper drops for changes in equity volatility. This implies 
that more than leverage, it is equity volatility that has a greater influence in 
driving large changes in DtD (Thomas et al. (2012)). 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
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3. Data 
The sample selection methodology is as follows: First, an exhaustive 
list of all listed and delisted monetary financial institutions is selected from 
Bankscope4 database (as on 10th February 2014). We obtain a total of 199 
firms in western Europe. Secondly, only firms whose shares were publicly 
listed and traded between the last quarter of 2004 till the second quarter of 
2013 and are headquartered in EMU countries are selected. Finally, credit 
institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage banks are 
removed. To formalize this decision, we use Datastream as an additional 
source of information. The major reason for this exclusion is the difference 
in liability structure and business model compared to banks. However it 
doesn’t mean that they are less risky to the financial system. 
This choice also ensures that the selected banks share the same accounting 
currency. However, it does not mean that they have a similar exchange rate 
risk profile, since the level of foreign currency exposure will depend on their 
respective asset profiles. The market-based data include daily observations 
of risk-free interest rates, daily stock price and total outstanding share in 
public. The list of variables and data sources are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Firms which were listed, delisted, nationalized or suffered any other rel- 
evant corporate actions are considered in the data set until they stopped 
trading on public exchanges. Due to the varying number of corporate ac- 
tions every quarter, the number of firms in the sample changes over time, 
both for the full sample and for individual countries (Figure 4) though the 
core banks remains the same over time. They have an aggregate weight of 
78% at the beginning of 2006 and of 86% at the end of it 2013-Q2. Therefore, 
we honestly do not think that changes in the bank sample composition over 
time may have a relevant impact on the forecasting properties of the dataset. 
The comprehensive list of firms used in this analysis is summarized in Table 
2.5 This detailed list of firms represents one of the best references for the 
EMU banking sector. 
 
 
 
4It provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for financial companies. 
5The period for which each firm was traded is also available but is not presented here in order 
to save space. This information is available from the authors upon  request. 
9  
[Table 2 about here.] 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
Computation of individual DtD: DtD is not measured directly; it is re- 
covered implicitly from the balance sheet and market price of firm’s 
liabilities. For our analysis we compute DtD at quarterly frequency. In 
practical terms, this means that the balance sheet information has to be 
modified from its original quarterly, half-yearly, or in few cases, yearly 
frequencies using cubic spline interpolation. Also the real debt contracts 
are not all written with a single terminal date. To overcome this problem, 
a common procedure used by Moody’s KMV (Vasicek (1984)) and also 
employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon (T = 1), but to weight 
longer term debt (maturity > 1 year) at only 50% of face value. The debt 
barrier (D) will then be equal to the face value of short-term liabilities 
plus half of the long-term liabili- ties. Equity value of the firm (E) is 
computed as the quarterly average of daily market capitalization 
(number of common shares x share prices) while quarterly historical 
volatility based on daily log-returns is taken as equity volatility (σE ). The 
individual DtD is then calibrated using the procedure outlined in Section 
2. 
Aggregating DtD series: In practice, the extension of DtD series as a 
system wide indicator has two major difficulties: 
1. At what level should they be aggregated?: Since we aim to focus on 
country level risk measurement in EMU, we would aggregate the DtD 
at country level; and 
2. How can individual banks’ data be aggregated as a system-wide rep- 
resentation?: We follow Saldias (2013), Harada and Ito (2008) and 
Harada et al. (2010), and take the simple cross-sectional equal-weighted 
average at each point in time for all banks headquartered in a partic- ular 
country as the aggregated risk measure. The simple average DtD for 
country i at time t is represented by aDtDi,t: 
 
N 
aDtDi,t = (1/N ) 
, 
DtDj,t (7) 
j=1 
where DtDj,t is the individual DtD for firm j at time t having head- 
quarter in country i. 
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This aggregation approach offers relative risk measures and is very at- 
tractive in terms of policy advice. However, this methodology has two major 
drawbacks. First, it ignores the latest modifications in DtD measurements 
to improve its relative performance (see Jessen and Lando (2015), Gray and 
Malone (2008) and Saldias (2013)). Since our focus is not on performance 
improvement of DtD, we took the most basic and intuitive measure to un- 
derstand bank risk. Secondly, it doesn’t incorporate the joint distribution 
properties (see Gray et al. (2007), Gray and Jobst (2010), Duggar and Mitra 
(2007), Gray et al. (2010) and Jobst and Gray (2013)). Since our aim here 
is to evaluate the underlying linkages among country level risk, we don’t in- 
corporate a priori dependence structure among banking institutions in our 
aggregation technique. 
Country-level aDtD: To visualize the country-wise banking risk behavior, 
we plot the aDtD for individual EMU countries (Figure 5). As can be seen, 
the level of aDtD differs considerably across countries. The series together 
show a trend and the variability across time is high. The pre-crisis level of 
aDtD is high (above 4) for almost all countries with Greece, Austria and Ire- 
land at the lower end. During the crisis period, all countries saw corrections 
in aDtD with Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece showing huge 
drops in aDtD level. Post 2007-08, the graph also suggest that the level of 
aDtD remain low for most of the countries. This implies that aDtD series 
is able to catch the trend and fluctuations during the current crisis. 
 
[Figure 5 about here.] 
 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Does aDtD provide information regarding risk buildup? 
As banking stress indicators, we compare the evolution of aDtD with 
banking sector equity and volatility indices.6   Figure 6 plots aDtD,    
bank 
 
 
 
6The country wise bank equity index is based on average logarithmic returns of all 
publicly traded banking firms headquartered in a particular country and are normalized to 100 
for all countries at the beginning of the last quarter in 2004. The volatility is equal 
weighted annualized equity price volatility based on the standard deviation of daily logarithmic 
returns of the previous quarter. This methodology creates an upward (down- ward) bias in the 
returns (volatility) indices due to bank failures and should be interpreted carefully. 
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equity index and volatility for each EMU country separately. The left axis 
represents the equity index level while the right axis represents the annualized 
volatility in percentage. The level of aDtD is scaled to show the general trend 
and variation with time. The graphs suggest that aDtD started 
deteriorating for most countries between 2006-07, except for France and 
the Netherlands. Notably, it started declining when bank index level 
showed an upward trend while volatility was quite stable.7 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The returns level suggests that the bank equity prices have fallen sub- 
stantially for all countries. The first period of rapid decline started around 
mid 2007, though some recovery was seen in 2009. The second period of 
decline started during the sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009, and still 
continues for some countries. For almost half of the sample, the index level 
at the end of 2012 is below the index value at the end of 2004. Greece, 
Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Italy witnessed the highest drop while Fin- 
land and Austria were largely unaffected. In some countries (like Portugal 
and Ireland) the index level shows a dramatic recovery post crisis. These 
spikes are due to the sudden drop in sample size due to bank failures and are 
therefore more notable for small countries having fewer  banks. 
The volatility of small countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Nether- 
lands and Austria) is relatively high. Post 2009, the volatility dropped for 
most EMU countries but has not yet returned to its pre-crisis level. European 
sovereign debt crisis, loss of market confidence and the need for continuous 
monetary support to banking sector may be explanations for the relatively 
high average volatility in peripheral countries. Given the changes in the sam- 
ple size in a few peripheral countries, the shift in the mean volatility level 
needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Equity indices and aDtD during the crisis: To compare the performance 
of equity indices with aDtD during the crisis, we analyze the country-wise 
behavior of market returns with aDtD during the financial crisis. As a pre- 
dictive indicator of future health, we examine the possibility by comparing 
the cumulative returns from 2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2 to 2009Q1 with the fall 
 
 
 
7It also indicates strong correlations with the average volatility, which undermines its 
effectiveness. 
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in level of aDtD indicator in each country. Figure 7a summarizes this in- 
formation aptly. As can be seen, most of the fall in DtD occurred between 
2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2, indicating a direct obvious prediction of 
vulnerability prior to the crisis. However, the total drop in returns shows 
no correlation with the drop in aDtD. 
Do initial level of aDtD matters?: Whether or not the initial level of 
aDtD matters, we plot the initial level of aDtD with the drop in aDtD 
during the crisis (Figure 7b) and find a positive relationship. This suggests 
that higher initial levels of aDtD experienced higher corrections during this 
period. The aDtD for most EMU countries averaged between 4 to 4 prior to 
the crisis. During the crisis (between 2007-Q2 and 2009-Q1), it fell sharply 
for Austria, France and Italy while for Portugal, Spain and Greece, the cor- 
rections were lower than expected. 
[Figure 7 about here.] 
4.2. Does aDtD render utile insights into market sentiments? 
Here we explore the association of aDtD with a selection of indicators 
covering broad market sentiments and sectoral bank indices collected 
from independent agencies, professional market data providers and 
other academic authors. 
At country level: We consider six variables as proxy for market sentiment: 
a consumer confidence indicator (CCI), stock returns (RET), the credit rating 
(RAT), a fiscal stance indicator (FSI), stock volatility (VOL), rating (RAT) 
and an index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU). As for the national bank 
indices, we examine two sectoral equities indices covering banks and 
financial services (Table 3). 
Table 4 shows that for the individual countries we find a positive associ- 
ation between aDtD, CCI and RET. In 7 out of 11 cases we detect a strong 
connection between our indicator and CCI, while for the RET we obtain 
a moderate or strong relationship in 6 out of 11. We also find a relatively 
moderate negative association with RAT and EPU and a strong negative cor- 
relation with VOL. For FSI we obtain mixed results. For the sectoral bank 
indices, regardless of the DtD indicator, our results suggest a moderate posi- 
tive association with both DSBANKS and DSFIN. The findings suggest that 
aDtDs are capturing the underlying trends that generate differences in risk 
perceptions of national banking  system. 
[Table 3 about here.] 
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[Table 4 about here.] 
 
At regional (Eurozone) level: We did a similar exercise to understand the 
association between regional market sentiments and financial indicators with 
aDtD. We find a strong positive association between aDtDs and the re- gional 
consumer confidence indicator and a strong negative relationship with regional 
economic policy uncertainty and regional financial market volatility. The 
associations with the indicator of credit quality in the EMU corpo- rate market 
and regional fiscal stance are moderate and positive while their connection with 
regional interest rate volatility (1-year forward) is mixed. Regarding the regional 
sectoral bank indices, there is evidence of a strong association with aDtDs in 
most cases. Interestingly, the aDtDs in the pe- ripheral countries strongly 
influence all EMU bank indices (both GIIPS8 and non-GIIPS), suggesting a 
strong co-movement tendencies among banking indices.9 
 
4.3. Can aDtD perform better than regulatory measure of prudential risk? 
We examine how country-wise aDtD perform with respect to the Euro- 
pean SIFI based aggregate banking risk indicator (ECBDtD) used by the 
European Central Bank. To check the better predictive ability of aDtD, we 
plot the ECBDtD together with aDtD in Figure 5. The graphical evidence 
suggests that aDtDs do suggest the deteriorating market conditions in most 
peripheral EMU countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece, Italy) and some central 
countries (Germany, Belgium and Finland) prior to the ECBDtD.1 
An additional dimension of considering comprehensive list of banks 
for each country is the increased informational content. To test whether 
this has a significant effect, we create a time-series of average DtD of all  
EMU banks in our sample (EMU − aDtD) and explore its relationship 
with the EMU macroeconomic uncertainty indicators compiled by the 
European Central Bank (2013) from a set of diverse sources: (1) 
measures of uncertainty perceived by economic agents about the future 
economic situation based on surveys; (2) measures of uncertainty or of 
                                                            
8Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
9Complete detail of regional indices and correlations are not attached to save space but are 
available upon request. 
1 Further results (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) suggest that default risk might be higher in 
the case of multinational rather than domestic oriented banks. ECB's calculation of DtD based on systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFI) also suggests that the level of aggregate DtD is low for SIFI. This is important, since 
multinational banks not only mean more interconnectedness, but also serve as buffer of regional shocks (Belke and Gros, 
2015). Indeed, cross-border capital flows in the form of equity appear to be much more stable than those taking the form of 
credit, especially inter-bank credit. Moreover, credit booms and bust leave a debt overhang and losses can materialize only 
via insolvencies, whereas equity flows absorb automatically losses in case of a bust and provide the cross border owner with 
incentives to continue to provide financing. It follows that cross-border banks can absorb regional shocks. But large banks 
pose the 'too big to fail' problem and they would also propagate regional shocks, especially if they originate in large 
countries, to the entire area (Belke, 2013, Belke and Gros, 2015). 
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risk aversion based on financial market indicators; and (3) measures of 
economic policy uncertainty. As far as the EMU banking risk measure is 
concerned, we use the EMUDtD. 
 
 
 
Regarding the measures of uncertainty related to future economic out- 
comes, we use the degree of disagreement about the projections for activity 
between professional forecasters measured as the standard deviation of 
the projections from Consensus Economics for annual real GDP growth 
in the following calendar year (ECBANY), the average “aggregate 
uncertainty”from the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(ECBBAVE), combining both disagreement between forecasters and 
individual uncertainty, and an indicator capturing the uncertainty of 
private households (ECBCHOU) and enterprises (ECBCBUS) based on 
the European Commission’s Business and Consumer Surveys. 
Additionally, to account for the concerns for the stability of the euro we 
have used the indicator built up by Klose and Weigert (2012) which 
reflects the market expectation of the probability that at least one euro 
area country will have left the currency union by the end of 2013 
(EUROINST). 
To assess financial market uncertainty or risk aversion measures, we 
use an average of a set of financial market indicators (implied bond and 
stock market volatility, implied EUR/US dollar volatility and CDS 
spreads over government bond yields) and a number of systemic stress 
indicators (exchange rate volatility, equity market volatility, bond market 
volatility, money market volatility, financial intermediation and a 
composite systemic stress indicator) (ECBDAVE). 
With respect to economic policy uncertainty, we use an index based 
on the newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty and 
the disagreement between forecasters with regard to the outlook for 
inflation and budget balances: These components are aggregated using 
weights of 50% for the former and 25% for each of the dispersion 
measures (ECBEAVE). Additionally, we make use of an indicator that 
combines all the individual sets of series by principal component analysis 
(ECBFPC). We select these measures of uncertainty because they show a 
significant negative correlation with key macroeconomic variables, such 
as quarterly growth rates of real GDP, total investment, private 
consumption and, in particular, total   employment. 
Table 5 summarizes the correlations of these indicators with ECB 
regulatory indicators. As can be seen, we find a significant and negative 
association between our indicators of EMU banking systemic risk based 
on DtD and the various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty, 
suggesting that higher banking systemic risk (signalled by a reduction in 
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DtD) will increase macroeconomic uncertainty and, as a consequence, 
adversely affect macroeconomic events. 
To test the predictive ability of this indicator with respect to the reg- 
ulatory indicators, we assessed the possible existence of Granger-
causality. As can be seen in Table 6, with the sole exception of 
ECBCHOU, we find a significant unidirectional Granger-causality 
relationship running from our indicators of EMU banking systemic risk 
to both the various measures of macroeconomic uncertainty and the 
banking risk indicator used by the ECB. This result gives further support 
to the hypothesized interconnection between DtDs and macroeconomic 
uncertainty and banking risk. 
 
[Table 5 about here.] 
[Table 6 about here.] 
Summary: Our empirical estimates using country level indices suggest 
that the country-wise aDtD has better predictive ability than the market 
based measures (returns and volatility) and is strongly connected with 
market sentiments at national and regional level. The initial level of aDtD 
matters and the drop is more significant for countries having higher 
aDtD. aDtD also have strong correlations with regulatory measures of 
risk and has higher information content. The direction of causality runs 
from aDtD to regulatory measures. 
 
5. Connectedness among countries banking risk 
In this section, we explore the linkages between aDtD using a cross coun- 
try connectedness measures. We use three ways to measure the connected- 
ness: (1) Correlations; (2) Granger causality; and (3) Diebold-Yilmaz con- 
nectedness index (DYCI) based on the variance decomposition of forecast 
errors. 
 
 
5.1. Correlation measures 
To understand the co-movement properties, we use three correlation 
mea- sures (parametric: Pearson, and non-parametric: Spearman and 
Kendell) in our analysis.10 Since the Pearson measure is the most 
commonly used, we report our findings based on Pearson correlations 
only, but they are also robust based on other measures. 
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[Table 7 about here.] 
 
For each measure of correlations, we first estimate the pair-wise corre- 
lations between the aDtD (Table 7). As can be seen, we find a strong 
correlation11 between indices, which suggests a common risk factor. This 
may also be due to the small sample, which contains two crisis episodes. To 
understand the time varying correlation dynamics, we tested for 
correlations using pre-/post crisis windows and apply a signed rank test to 
evaluate the null hypothesis that the mean and median correlations are 
equal if we divide the time period in two half (pre and post 2009-Q4). 
The results suggest that except Germany and Finland, all other 
countries shows very strong correlations with EMU average. This also 
suggest a com- mon risk factor which we test in the next section. Belgium, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal have strong inter-linkages and connections 
across the board. Bel- gian banking sector shows strong connections with 
all EMU countries except Germany and the Netherlands. Germany is 
strongly connected with only Italy and moderately to France, Austria and 
Finland. For other peripheral countries, Germany has weak correlations. 
 
5.2. Granger causality 
The graphic behavior of the countries’ aDtD series and correlation 
estimates suggests an underlying trend. It may be due to an increase in 
the systemic risk of global financial industry due to cross linkages, 
increased volatility or investment in correlated assets. To understand this 
spillover within the EMU banking sector, we run Granger causality tests 
for each pair-wise country aDtDs. We find very weak evidence of 
causality running from a particular country towards the rest of the 
countries (Figure 8), which suggests that the banking risk captured by 
countries’ aDtDs remains idiosyncratic (suggestive evidence of no 
systemic component).To test the robustness of our results, we also did 
the analysis based on banks’ market capital and as- set based weighted 
average DtD. The results (not shown here to save space, but they are 
available from the authors upon request) render the same qualitative 
conclusions than in the case of using aDtDs. 
 
[Figure 8 about here.] 
 
 
 
11We use the adjective “strong” when the absolute value of the correlation is above 0.8, 
“moderate”when it is between 0.7-0.8, and “weak” when it is between 0.6-0.7. 
20  
I 
ij 
5.3. Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measure 
To explore further the systemic underlying component among aDtD in- 
dices, we use VAR (vector auto regression) methodologies based measure of 
connectedness. The connectedness is based on the decomposition of the fore- 
cast error variance, which is briefly described here. For a multivariate time 
series, the forecast error variance decomposition works as follows: 
• First, we fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series; 
• Secondly, using series data up to, and including, time t, establish an H 
period ahead forecast (up to time t + H); and 
• Finally, decompose the forecast error variance for each component with 
respect to shocks from the same or other components at time t. 
 
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating 
process (DGP) with orthogonal shocks: 
 
xt = Θ(L)ut, Θ(L) = Θ0 + Θ1L + Θ2L
2 + ..., E(ut, ut) = I 
Note that Θ0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness are 
contained in this very general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of 
connectedness are summarized in Θ0 and dynamic aspects in Θ1, Θ2, ... 
Trans- formation of Θ1, Θ2, ... via variance decompositions in needed to 
reveal and 
compactly summarize connectedness. Let us denote by dH the ij-th H-step 
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dH 
i    j 
/= 
C 
CH d 
CH d 
variance decomposition component (i. e., the fraction of variable i’s H- 
step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). The connectedness 
measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance decompositions, 
ij , i, j = 1, ..., N, i /= j. 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose several connectedness measures 
built from  pieces  of  variance  decompositions  in  which  the  forecast  
error  variance of  variable  i  is  decomposed  into  parts  attributed  to  the  
various  variables in  the  system.   Here  we  provide  a  snapshot  of  their  
connectedness  index. They  proposed  a  connectedness  table  such  as  
Table  ??  to  understand  the various connectedness measures and their 
relationships.  Its main upper-left N xN block, that contains the variance 
decompositions, is called the “variance decomposition matrix,” and is 
denoted it by DH  = [dij ] The connectedness table augments DH  with a 
rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom row containing column 
sums, and a bottom-right element containing the grand average, in all 
cases for i /= j. 
The off-diagonal entries of DH are the parts of the N forecast-error vari- 
ance decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In par- 
ticular, the gross pairwise directional connectedness from j to i is defined as 
follows: 
 
CH H 
 
Since in general CH 
← 
 
H 
j←i 
i←j  = dij 
the net pairwise directional connectedness 
from j to i, can be defined as: 
 
CH H H 
ij = Cj←i − Ci←j 
Regarding the off-diagonal row sums in Table ??, they give the share of 
the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising 
in other variables (all other, as opposed to a single other), while the off- 
diagonal column sums provide the share of the H-step forecast-error variance 
of variable xi going to shocks arising in other variables. Hence, the off- 
diagonal row and column sums, labeled “from” and “to” in the connectedness 
table, offer the total directional connectedness measures. In particular, total 
directional connectedness from others to i is defined  as 
 
i←• = 
 
N 
, 
H
 
ij 
j=1,j¡
=i 
 
The total directional connectedness to others from i is defined   as 
 
•←i = 
 
N 
, 
H
 
ji 
j=1,j¡
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d 
N 
C = 
=i 
 
We  can also define net total directional connectedness   as 
 
CH H H 
i  = C•←i − Ci←• 
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, 
the sum of the “from” column or “to” row) measures total  connectedness: 
 
H 1 , H 
ij 
N  
i,j=1,j¡=i 
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ij 
= 
d 
d˜g i,j=
1 
d 
ij 
g 
 
 
 
 
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks the variance decompositions are 
not easily calculated as before because the variance of a weighted sum is not 
an appropriate sum of variances; in this case methodologies for providing 
orthogonal innovations like traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be 
sensitive to ordering. So, following Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a general- 
ized VAR decomposition (GVD), invariant to ordering, proposed by Koop 
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) will be employed. The H-step 
generalized variance decomposition matrix is defined as DgH = [dgH ], where 
 
−1 H−1 I 
dgH 
σij   
),
h=0  (eiΘh 
), 
ej ) 
ij  = ),H−1 I I 
h=0  (eiΘh 
), 
Θhej ) 
In  this  case,  ej   is  a  vector  with  j
th  element  unity  and  zeros  elsewhere, 
Θh   is  the  coefficient  matrix  in  the  infinite  moving-average  representation 
from VAR, 
), 
is the covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non- 
orthogonalized-VAR, σij being its jth diagonal element. In this GVD frame- 
work, the lack of orthogonality makes it so that the rows of do not have sum 
unity and, in order to get a generalized connectedness index D˜ g   = [d˜ g  ], the 
following normalization is necessary: 
g 
g˜ ij 
ij ),N g  , where by construction 
),N 
j=1 ij = 1 and 
),N 
i˜j 
 
= N . 
j=1 
d
ij 
The matrix D˜ g = [d˜ g ] permits us to define similar concepts as defined 
before for the orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net 
total  directional  connectedness  and  total   connectedness. 
Tables 8 and 9 present the connectedness tables for aDtD based on 6 
months and 1 year horizon, along with the nonparametrically bootstrapped 
standard errors, while Figure 9 shows the most important directional connec- 
tions among the pairs of 12 aDtDs based on the top three deciles (black, red 
and orange respectively). As can be seen, all the connectedness measures 
in that Table are statistically different from zero at least at the 5% level. 
The Netherlands show very weak connectedness while Germany and Italy 
shows linkages only with Finland and Portugal respectively. Spain, Belgium, 
Portugal and Austria have high connectedness with most EMU countries ex- 
cept for the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. Even for changing horizon, the 
results remain quite consistent. In most cases, the effects seem to dry out 
but the connectedness pair remain the same. Finally, we observe a value of 
73.67% for the total connectedness between aDtD in a horizon of 6 months 
and value 76.72% for a year, in line with the values of 78.3% obtained by 
d 
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Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) for US financial institutions. To test the robust- 
ness of our results, we also did the analysis based on banks’ market capital 
and asset based weighted average DtD. The results (not shown here to save 
space, but they are available from the authors upon request) render the same 
qualitative conclusions than in the case of using aDtDs. 
 
[Table 8 about here.] 
[Table 9 about here.] 
[Figure 9 about here.] 
6. Conclusion 
By analyzing the behavior and fluctuations of a market based banking 
risk indicator for individual EMU countries, we find that aDtD is an in- 
tuitive, simple and convenient forward looking risk measure. The level of 
aDtD varies with country suggesting cross-sectional structural differences 
across the banking sector and captures trends as well as fluctuations in the 
financial markets. Analysis during the crisis period suggests better predictive 
ability (12-18 months prior to the crisis) for most of the EMU countries. The 
initial level of aDtD matters but the change in aDtD is more pronounced 
for countries with a higher initial level. 
When compared with other regulatory risk and market sentiment mea- 
sures, aDtDs shows better predictive ability and very high correlations. The 
strong association between aDtDs and regional (Eurozone) market sentiment 
(uncertainty)/sectoral banking indices also improves the explanatory power. 
The Granger causality test reveals the direction of causality running from 
aDtDs to Eurozone risk indicators (and not the other way round) suggesting 
better information content. 
The correlations analysis suggests strong inter-linkages across country 
level banking stress but low inter-linkage between core and peripheral EMU 
countries. Taking s step further, we tested for a systemic component using 
Granger causality tests and found negative results. To better understand the 
dependence structure, we explored further by analyzing the connectedness us- 
ing Diebold-Yilmaz Connectedness Index and found very low connectedness 
among country level banking risk  indices. 
Most recent literature has highlighted huge connectedness among System- 
ically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) and high degree of joint risk of 
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default. But our empirical estimates which uses country level indices suggest 
otherwise, that the country-wise aDtD has higher predictive ability and is 
strongly connected with market sentiments but the connectedness among the 
country-wise aDtD is low. Suggesting that the inter-linkages may be higher 
for SIFI but for the country level banking sector, the connectedness is low. 
This result will be beneficial for implementing a priori dependence structure 
in the computation of systemic risk. 
So, there are various reasons for considering country-wise risk indicators 
alongside regional market and other risk measures. As the statistical theory 
suggests, when faced with two estimators for the same underlying variable, 
it is optimal to combine the two. Tracking country specific indices provide 
additional information related to the average risk level and their ability to 
forecast the risk buildup cannot be ignored. The results might be beneficial 
to policymakers since, given the current structure of financial markets and 
market regulations, it makes sense to track systemic risk indicators at the 
national level. Following the systemic risk indicators based on large, complex 
EU-wide financial institution may delay the prediction of risk buildup. 
DtD measures can also be extended beyond the banking context. The 
theoretical argument being a kind of option value of waiting under 
uncertainty can be extended to international trade literature and test its 
impact on investment, export, import and employment (Belke and Gros 
(2001)). Further extension can also help examine the interconnection 
between banking and sovereign risk in the euro area (Gómez-Puig et al. 
(2015)) and to explore if the Banking Union in the Euro Area could 
influence it  by disentangling the risk of the EMU banks and their 
governments (Belke, 2013, Belke and Gros, 2015) and by changing the risk 
pattern.  
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Table 1:  Description of variables 
 
 
Balance sheet variables Source 
 
 
Total assets As reported in annual/interim   reports Bankscope (Code 
2025) Short-term liabilities       Deposits and short term  funding Bankscope (Code 
2030) Total equity As  reported in annual/interim  reports Bankscope (Code 
2055) 
 
Daily market based variables 
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of 
country  where 
the bank headquarter is based 
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by  
total 
outstanding share in  public 
 
Thomson 
Datastream 
Thomson 
Datastream 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: List of banks (by country) 
 
AT - UniCredit Bank Austria AG (AT0000995006)* FR - Boursorama (FR0000075228) 
AT - Erste Group Bank AG (AT0000652011) FR - Cr´edit Agricole du Morbihan 
(FR0000045551) AT - Raiffeisen Bank International AG (AT0000606306) FR - Cr´edit Agricole 
Brie Picardie (FR0010483768) 
BE - Dexia (BE0003796134) FR - Soci´ et´ e Alsacienne de D´eveloppement et 
d’Expansion (FR0000124315)* 
BE - KBC Groep NV   (BE0003565737) GR - National Bank of Greece SA    
(GRS003003019) DE - Landesbank Berlin Holding AG    (DE0008023227)* GR - Piraeus Bank 
SA   (GRS014003008) 
DE  -  Hypothekenbank  Frankfurt  AG (DE0008076001)* GR - Eurobank Ergasias SA    
(GRS323003004) DE - UniCredit Bank  AG   (DE0008022005)* GR - Alpha Bank AE   
(GRS015013006) 
DE - Oldenburgische Landesbank (DE0008086000) GR - Marfin Investment Group (GRS314003005) 
DE - Deutsche Postbank AG    (DE0008001009) GR - Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA   
(GRS001003003) DE - UmweltBank AG   (DE0005570808) GR - General Bank of Greece SA   
(GRS002003010) 
DE - Hypo Real Estate Holding AG     (DE0008027707)* IE - Depfa Bank Plc   (IE0072559994)* 
DE - HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG  (DE0008115106) IE - Irish Bank Resolution Corp.  Ltd.  
(IE00B06H8J93)* 
DE - Deutsche Bank AG (DE0005140008) IE - Permanent TSB Plc    
(IE0004678656)* DE  -  Commerzbank  AG (DE000CBK1001) IE - Bank of Ireland   
(IE0030606259) 
DE  -  Wu¨stenrot  &  Wu¨rttembergische  (DE0008051004) IE - Allied Irish Banks plc   
(IE0000197834) DE - Comdirect Bank  AG   (DE0005428007) IT - UniCredit SpA 
(IT0004781412) 
DE - Net-M Privatbank 1891 AG    (DE0008013400)* IT  -  Intesa  Sanpaolo (IT0000072618) 
DE  -  Merkur-Bank  KGaA (DE0008148206) IT - Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA  
(IT0001334587) DE - Quirin Bank AG   (DE0005202303) IT - Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa    
(IT0003487029) 
ES - Banco Santander SA (ES0113900J37) IT  -  Banco  Popolare  Societa  `  Cooperativa   
(IT0004231566) 
ES - Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
(ES0113211835) 
IT - Mediobanca SpA (IT0000062957) 
ES - Caixabank, S.A.   (ES0140609019) IT - Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 
(IT0000066123) ES - Bankia, SA  (ES0113307021) IT - Banca Popolare di  Milano SCaRL    
(IT0000064482) ES - Banco de Sabadell SA   (ES0113860A34) IT - Banca Carige SpA   
(IT0003211601) 
ES - Banco Popular Espanol SA    (ES0113790226) IT  -  Banca  Popolare  di  Sondrio  Societa  
Cooperativa per 
Azioni (IT0000784196) 
ES - Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo    (ES0114400007) IT  -  Credito  Emiliano  SpA-CREDEM 
(IT0003121677) ES - Bankinter SA   (ES0113679I37) IT - Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop    
(IT0000064516) 
ES - Renta 4 Banco, S.A.   (ES0173358039) IT - Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc.      
coop. 
(IT0004919327) 
FI - Pohjola Bank Plc (FI0009003222) IT - Credito Bergamasco (IT0000064359) 
FI - Aktia Bank Plc (FI4000058870) IT - Banco di Sardegna SpA (IT0001005070) 
FI - Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland
 Plc (FI0009001127) 
IT - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA 
(IT0001041000) 
FR - Cr´edit Agricole Sud Rhoˆne Alpes (FR0000045346) IT - Banca Ifis SpA (IT0003188064) 
FR - Paris Orl´eans SA (FR0000031684) IT - Banca Generali SpA (IT0001031084) 
FR - Cr´edit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou 
(FR0000045304) 
IT - Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni 
(IT0000074077) 
FR - Credit Agricole Alpes Provence (FR0000044323) IT - Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA 
(IT0001007209) FR - Cr´edit Agricole Nord de France (FR0000185514) IT - Banca Profilo 
SpA (IT0001073045) 
FR - Cr´edit Agricole d’Ile-de-France (FR0000045528) IT - Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA  
(IT0000088853) FR - Cr´edit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire (FR0000045239) NL - SNS Reaal NV 
(NL0000390706)* 
FR  -  Cr´edit  Industriel  et  Commercial (FR0005025004) NL - RBS Holdings NV  
 (NL0000301109)* FR  -  Banque  Tarneaud (FR0000065526)* NL - ING Groep NV  
(NL0000303600) 
FR - Caisse r´egionale de Cr´edit Agricole Mutuel 
de Normandie-Seine  (FR0000044364) 
FR - Caisse R´egionale de Cr´edit Agricole Mutuel 
du Languedoc (FR0010461053) 
NL - Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group  
(NL0009294552) 
 
NL - Van  Lanschot NV  (NL0000302636) 
FR  -  Natixis (FR0000120685) NL - BinckBank NV  (NL0000335578) 
FR - Cr´edit Agricole de l’Ille-et-Vilaine (FR0000045213) PT - Montepio Holding SGPS SA     
(PTFNB0AM0005)* FR - Cr´edit Agricole d’Aquitaine (FR0000044547)* PT  -  Banco  Comercial  
Portuguˆes,  SA (PTBCP0AM0007) FR - Soci´ et´ e G´en´erale (FR0000130809) PT  -  Banco  Espirito  Santo  SA 
(PTBES0AM0007) 
FR - Cr´edit Agricole S.A. (FR0000045072) PT  -  Banco  BPI  SA (PTBPI0AM0004) 
FR - BNP Paribas (FR0000131104) 29 PT  -  BANIF,  SA (PTBAF0AM0002) 
 
Notes: Parenthesis contains the ISIN (International Securities Identification Number), 
an asterisk (*) mark represents companies which got delisted during the study period. 
SIFI are indicated in italics (based on Bank of International Settlements G-SIBs as of 
November  2014). 
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Table 3: National financial indicators 
 
Market  sentiment indicators 
Variable Description Source 
Consumer 
Confidence In- dicator 
(CCI) 
This index is built up by the European 
Com- mission which conducts regular 
harmonized surveys of consumers in 
each country. 
European 
Commission 
(DG ECFIN) 
Stock  Returns  (RET) Differences between logged stock indices 
prices 
of the last and the first day of the 
quarter for each country. 
Rating (RAT) Credit  rating  scale  built  up  from     
Fitch, 
Moodys, S&P ratings for each country. 
Fol- lowing Blanco (2001), we built up a 
quarterly scale to estimate the effect of 
investor senti- ment based on the 
rating offered by these three rating 
agencies. 
Datastream 
 
 
Bloomberg 
Index of Fiscal 
Stance (FSI) 
This indicator compares a target level 
of the debt-GDP ratio at a given 
point in the fu- ture with a forecast 
based on the government budget 
constraint. It was built by Polito and 
Wickens (2011, 2012). 
Provided
 b
y the 
authors 
Stock Volatility (VOL) Quarterly average of monthly standard  
devia- 
tion of the daily returns of each country’s 
stock market general index 
Datastream 
Index of Economic 
Policy Uncertainty 
(EPU) 
This index draws on the frequency of 
news- paper references to policy 
uncertainty; it was built for Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain and EMU by 
Baker et al. (2013). 
www.policyuncertainty.c
om 
 
Sectoral  bank indices 
 
Variable Description Source 
DSBANKS 
DSFIN 
DataStream Equity Index-Banks 
DataStream Equity Index-Financial  
Services 
DataStream 
DataStream 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations between aDtDs and national financial 
indicators 
 
aDtD 
Market  sentiment indicators Sectoral  bank indices 
CCI RET RAT FSI VOL EPU DSBANKS DSFIN 
AT 0.87 0.08 - -0.55 -0.86 - 0.70 0.49 
BE 0.80 -0.03 -0.34 -0.64 -0.94 - 0.58 0.90 
31 
 
DE 0.71 0.40 - -0.83 -0.92 -0.51 0.44 0.53 
ES 0.58 -0.03 0.22 -0.31 -0.69 -0.30 0.49 0.29 
FI 0.53 0.05 - 0.17 -0.88 - 0.31 - 
FR 0.76 0.56 -0.10 -0.64 -0.94 -0.71 0.47 0.90 
GR 0.79 0.67 -0.60 0.65 -0.88 - 0.81 0.41 
IE 0.87 0.75 -0.58 0.87 -0.83 - 0.82 0.24 
IT 0.68 0.53 -0.61 0.04 -0.92 -0.64 0.60 0.66 
NL 0.59 0.51 - 0.35 -0.87 - 0.70 0.66 
PT 0.24 0.06 -0.34 -0.36 -0.95 - 0.21 0.23 
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Table 5: Cross correlation of EMU-aDtDs with ECB indicators 
 
Macroeconomic uncertainty 
indicators 
EMU-aDtD 
ECBANY -0.62 
ECBBAVE -0.66 
ECBCHOU -0.64 
ECBCBUS -0.53 
ECBEAVE -0.85 
ECBFPC -0.85 
EUROINST -0.94 
Banking risk indicator EMU-aDtD 
ECBEMUDD 0.67 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Granger causality between EMU-aDtDs and ECB indicators 
 
Macroeconomic  uncertainty indicators 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant 
at ECBANY does not Granger Cause 
EMUADTD 
2.29 0.12  
CBBAVE does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
0.28 0.76  
CBCHOU does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
1.97 0.16  
CBCBUS does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
1.39 0.27  
CBEAVE does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
0.40 0.67  
CBFPC does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
0.32 0.73  
UROINST does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
6.18 0.04 5% 
Banking  risk indicators 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant 
at ECBEMUDD does not Granger Cause  
EMUADTD 
0.12 0.89  
Macroeconomic  uncertainty indicators 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Stats Prob. Significant 
at EMUADTD does not Granger Cause 
ECBANY 
5.08 0.01 5% 
MU DTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBBAVE 
8.76 0.00 1% 
MUADTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBCHOU 
0.64 0.53  
MUADTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBCBUS 
4.00 0.03 5% 
MUADTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBEAVE 
2.93 0.07 10% 
MUADTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBFPC 
7.51 0.00 1% 
MUADTD does not Granger Cause  
EUROINST 
4.09 0.01 5% 
Banking  risk indicators 
 
Null Hypothesis F-
Stats 
Prob. Significant 
at EMUADTD does not Granger Cause  
ECBEMUDD 
6.53 0.0047 1% 
33  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Correlations among aggregate DtD indices 
 
 AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT 
BE 0.83          
ES 0.70 0.83         
DE 0.79 0.66 0.65        
FI 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.78       
FR 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.62      
GR 0.74 0.89 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.69     
IE 0.78 0.93 0.86 0.62 0.63 0.74 0.84    
IT 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.78   
NL 0.79 0.79 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.80  
PT 0.77 0.84 0.73 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.77 0.84 0.67 
EMU 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.88 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Connectedness among country-wise banking risk - aDtD 
 
 
Horizon 6 months 
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU From 
AT 19.35** 3.76** 1.30* 4.95** 22.3** 5.40** 5.09** 4.76** 3.66** 3.77** 13.15* 12.42** 80.65** 
 (0.73) (0.18) (0.45) (0.24) (1.12) (0.31) (0.99) (1.01) (0.98) (0.18) (5.11) (2.12) (1.24) 
BE 6.50** 7.58** 5.72** 5.94** 18.18** 4.45** 9.81** 3.30** 6.00** 3.43** 17.13** 11.95** 92.42** 
 (1.89) (0.57) (1.07) (0.66) (1.45) (0.82) (2.01) (0.75) (1.35) (0.35) (1.81) (1.45) (1.3) 
ES 5.59** 4.14** 16.78** 3.52** 13.77** 4.51** 9.09** 4.65** 10.14** 6.01** 10.00** 11.81 83.22** 
 (1.32) (1.21) (0.45) (0.23) (2.11) (0.67) (2.11) (1.12) (1.62) (1.13) (1.22) (1.57**) (1.12) 
DE 8.22** 2.54** 1.63** 38.97** 14.19** 9.51** 7.12** 5.48** 5.62** 1.10** 0.58** 5.04** 61.03** 
 (0.91) (0.48) (0.22) (0.66) (0.71) (0.52) (0.84) (0.73) (0.45) (0.23) (0.15) (0.78) (1.91) 
FI 12.77** 3.57** 2.39* 5.72** 33.04** 4.54** 3.97** 3.85** 8.15* 3.12** 6.18* 12.70** 66.96** 
 (2.54) (0.98) (0.99) (0.47) (1.12) (1.01) (0.74) (0.84) (0.51) (0.42) (2.44) (1.34) (1.71) 
FR 10.2** 3.38** 1.45** 14.28** 14.95** 27.47** 4.37** 5.41** 2.82** 5.33** 2.23** 8.13** 72.53** 
 (1.77) (0.55) (0.22) (0.76) (0.69) (0.55) (0.51) (0.58) (0.37) (0.54) (0.51) (1.11) (1.48) 
GR 4.77* 3.91* 3.79* 6.58** 6.77* 2.98** 28.52** 1.55** 4.13** 5.19* 24.74** 7.07** 71.48** 
 (1.89) (1.55) (1.41) (1.26) (2.77) (0.61) (0.47) (0.32) (0.42) (1.91) (1.54) (1.45) (1.98) 
IE 13.42** 3.84** 2.88* 10.71** 15.96** 10.95** 2.69** 15.06** 5.18** 4.38* 6.67** 8.26** 84.94** 
 (4.15) (0.99) (1.11) (2.46) (2.93) (3.16) (0.34) (0.26) (0.55) (1.61) (1.03) (1.03) (1.74) 
IT 4.68** 4.89** 6.76** 5.43** 10.28** 2.28** 3.99** 2.23** 20.16** 6.21* 18.98** 14.12** 79.84** 
 (1.12) (1.34) (0.43) (0.78) (.1.54) (0.81) (0.52) (0.43) (0.49) (1.71) (1.14) (2.11) (1.63) 
NL 5.45** 2.85** 3.12** 1.57** 6.95** 6.14** 5.22** 0.85* 9.37** 42.32** 5.39* 10.77** 57.68** 
 (0.97) (0.69) (0.31) (0.24) (0.45) (0.28) (0.63) (0.35) (1.12) (0.35) (2.13) (1.28) (1.34) 
PT 4.85* 4.40** 4.16** 4.8** 4.54* 1.20** 4.56** 0.96** 6.52** 2.50* 51.65** 9.87** 48.35** 
(1.98) (1.55) (0.14) (1.29) (1.77) (0.17) (0.34) (0.14) (0.26) (0.99) (0.32) (1.42) (1.18) 
 
EMU 
 
9.04** 
 
5.51** 
 
4.74** 
 
4.39** 
 
16.52** 
 
4.93** 
 
5.07** 
 
3.31** 
 
9.44** 
 
6.35** 
 
15.66** 
 
15.06** 
 
84.94** 
(1.02) (0.56) (0.88) (0.65) (1.11) (0.79) (0.89) (0.99) (1.28) (0.87) (1.12) (0.15) (0.78) 
 
To 
 
81.54** 
 
84.95** 
 
69.34** 
 
63.54** 
 
81.38** 
 
67.47** 
 
68.13** 
 
70.7** 
 
77.89** 
 
52.83** 
 
70.03** 
 
88.16** 
 
73.67** 
(1.77) (1.36) (1.61) (1.43) (1.37) (1.29) (1.73) (1.19) (1.88) (1.64) (1.45) (0.91) (0.41) 
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in parenthesis.  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels,   
respectively. 
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Table 9: Connectedness among country-wise banking risk - aDtD 
 
 
Horizon 1 year 
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU From 
AT 18.15** 3.91** 1.66* 4.70** 21.34** 4.67** 5.87** 4.35** 4.50** 4.31** 13.71** 12.84** 81.85** 
 (0.99) (0.31) (0.57) (0.2) (1.31) (0.37) (0.94) (0.91) (1.15) (0.21) (4.08) (1.72) (1.39) 
BE 7.34** 7.68** 3.98 5.09** 17.00** 3.34** 10.12** 3.31** 7.00** 4.04** 17.14* 13.96** 92.32** 
 (1.49) (0.62) (0.87) (0.75) (1.57) (0.41) (2.15) (0.68) (0.95) (0.31) (1.52) (1.24) (1.75) 
ES 6.81** 5.37** 9.81** 2.66** 16.15** 2.85** 12.03** 3.66** 9.14** 8.12** 10.93** 12.47** 90.19** 
 (1.19) (1.21) (1.78) (0.21) (2.18) (0.37) (1.95) (0.76) (0.78) (0.98) (1.29) (1.44) (2.16) 
DE 6.68** 3.71** 1.74** 32.04** 12.82** 6.68** 9.46** 3.96** 7.22** 1.49** 6.52** 7.67** 67.96** 
 (0.85) (0.31) (0.55) (0.51) (1.53) (0.74) (0.77) (0.65) (0.41) (0.25) (1.49) (1.03) (1.37) 
FI 12.47** 3.73** 2.03** 5.48** 30.61** 4.47** 4.93** 4.27** 8.81** 3.26** 6.20* 13.74** 69.39** 
 (2.43) (0.64) (0.66) (0.49) (1.26) (0.99) (0.89) (0.86) (0.84) (0.44) (2.44) (1.45) (1.28) 
FR 8.19** 4.71** 1.86** 11.02** 13.89** 19.95** 6.14** 3.34** 4.14** 6.11** 9.12** 11.54** 80.05** 
 (1.61) (0.66) (0.45) (0.73) (0.97) (0.54) (0.61) (0.42) (0.67) (0.61) (1.61) (1.25) (1.39) 
GR 7.71** 3.86* 1.51* 7.18** 8.71* 2.77** 29.04** 3.02** 1.87** 5.57* 23.03** 5.71** 70.96** 
 (1.27) (1.53) (0.58) (1.42) (3.55) (0.47) (0.44) (0.56) (0.35) (2.05) (1.42) (1.07) (1.42) 
IE 13.90** 5.12** 2.28** 9.76** 18.35** 5.00** 5.47** 11.37** 4.77** 3.64* 10.50** 9.85** 88.63** 
 (2.33) (1.03) (0.89) (2.13) (1.77) (1.03) (0.56) (0.39) (0.51) (1.24) (0.97) (1.18) (1.26) 
IT 6.26** 5.65** 4.54** 7.11** 14.99** 2.93** 5.36** 2.36** 16.47** 5.78* 16.10** 12.44* 83.53** 
 (1.24) (1.22) (0.83) (0.75) (1.65) (0.67) (1.24) (0.39) (0.91) (1.58) (0.97) (2.15) (1.44) 
NL 7.42** 3.69** 2.25 2.44 7.74** 8.80** 7.81** 1.43** 6.69** 38.76** 3.28* 9.66** 61.24** 
 (0.75) (0.73) (0.72) (0.53) (1.68) (0.51) (0.63) (0.21) (1.12) (0.52) (1.28) (1.42) (1.57) 
PT 5.80* 4.87** 2.54** 6.51** 6.13** 2.16** 5.46** 1.19** 3.82** 2.83* 50.67** 8.01** 49.33** 
(2.34) (1.23) (0.45) (2.01) (1.33) (0.25) (0.41) (0.17) (0.24) (1.12) (2.14) (1.46) (1.02) 
EMU 10.17** 6.07** 3.17** 4.91** 17.69** 4.76** 6.60** 3.19** 7.70** 5.49** 15.45** 14.82** 85.18** 
(1.41) (0.71) (0.56) (0.59) (1.14) (0.84) (0.92) (0.84) (1.21) (0.84) (0.93) (0.47) (1.41) 
To 83.64** 86.85** 73.75** 67.61** 83.49** 70.83** 73.18** 74.98** 79.95** 56.64** 72.26** 88.83** 76.72** 
(1.91) (1.41) (1.33) (1.12) (1.48) (1.25) (1.42) (1.24) (1.55) (1.66) (1.57) (1.11) (0.51) 
Note:  Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in parenthesis.  ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels,   
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Size distribution of banks in each EMU country 
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AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: 
Greece, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European 
Economic and Monetary Union. We show the relative size of banking firms (by total 
assets in 2010) for each EMU country under study, being the total asset of the biggest 
bank in a particular country normalized to one. Source: Bankscope. 
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Figure 2:  Economic dependence and home  bias 
 
 
ES ES 
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NL NL 
LX LX 
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IE IE 
GR GR 
DE DE 
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BE BE 
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0 5 10 15 20 25 
Total bank assets as a multiple of GDP (in 2008) 
(a) MFI total assets as multiple of 
GDP 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Banks holding of sovereign debt (in December 2011) 
(b) Banks’ holding of its own sovereign 
bonds (as % of total notional 
outstanding) 
MFI: Monetary Financial Institution as classified by Organization for International Co-
operation and 
Development (OECD). Datasource: OECD, National Central Banks, European Bank 
Authority stress test 2011 and  Eurostat. 
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Figure 3: ISO-DtD curves 
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The lines represent different values of DtD for varying combinations of leverage and equity volatility. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  No of banks used every period for each   country 
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Figure 5:  Country level aDtD 
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Figure 6:  Country-wise indices 
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Figure 7: Equity index and aDtD during the  crisis 
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Figure 8: Linkages based on Granger causality tests 
 
 
 
Notes:  We show the most important directional causalities among the pairs of 12 countries’ 
aDtDs.  Red and orange lines represent significance at 10% and 5% level respectively. 
 
Figure 9:  Net directional connectedness among  aDtDs 
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(b) Based on 1 year horizon 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the pairs of 12 
countries’ aDtDs. 
Black, red and orange lines represent the first, second and third deciles based on net 
pairwise directional connectedness derived from Tables 8 and 9. 
